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INTRODUCTION

Informal social norms play a crucial, albeit largely unheralded, role in negligence law. The reasonable person standard is an
empty vessel that jurors fill with community norms. Jurors do this
rather than performing cost-benefit analysis. The proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Principles (Discussion Draft)
("Discussion Draft") misses both of these points. It dramatically
overstates the role of utilitarian, cost-benefit analysis in the reasonable person standard, and it dramatically understates the role of
non-utilitarian negligence norms in this standard. This Article will
explore these twin failings of the Discussion Draft.
The negligence cause of action makes up the lion's share of
modern tort law. Negligence is thus the focus of the Discussion
Draft of the "General Principles" of tort law.1 It is settled law that
there are four elements to a cause of action in negligence-duty,
breach, causation, and damage. 2 I will raise the question whether
the Discussion Draft properly characterizes the case law with respect to the second element, breach. The Discussion Draft strongly
endorses a Hand Test formulation for determining the standard for
breach.' Specifically, the so-called balancing test is interpreted in
terms of cost-benefit analysis. 4 While the Hand Test is not inherently utilitarian, nevertheless, in the Discussion Draft's analysis,
this test is transformed into a tool for the advancement of social
welfare, the touchstone of utilitarian value theory. 5 I will argue
that this mischaracterizes case law, however, as the common law of
negligence is not best interpreted as utilitarian.
With regard to duty, the first element of a cause of action in
negligence, Professors Goldberg and Zipursky argue that the Discussion Draft mischaracterizes case law because it fails to list duty
as an element despite the fact that almost all United States juris-

1.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 4-5 (Discussion Draft Apr.
5, 1999) [hereinafter Discussion Draft].
2. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 130 (10th ed. 2000) (describing the four elements as "[a] duty to use reasonable care

... [a] failure to conform to the required standard . . . [a] reasonably close causal connection
between the conduct and the resulting injury ... [and] [a]ctual loss or damage resulting to the
interests of another").
3.
Id. § 4 cmt. c, d.
4.
Id. § 4cmt. d.
5.
Discussion Draft, supra note 1, § 4 cmt. j ("By imposing the threat of liability, the law
seeks to encourage the defendant to avoid negligence-that is, to adopt reasonable safety precautions. The defendant's adoption of these precautions improves the overall welfare of society, and
thereby advances economic goals.").

2001]

NEGLIGENCENORMS

dictions routinely and overwhelmingly list duty as the first element
to be established in a negligence cause of action. G Because a restatement should, by definition, restate the core features of the law
for which it claims to be a restatement, in effect, Goldberg and
Zipursky may be seen as arguing that the Discussion Draft is not a
restatement with respect to the duty element.
If Goldberg and Zipursky are right that the Discussion Draft
fails to restate the element of duty, and I am right that the Discussion Draft fails to restate the law of breach, we may fairly conclude
that the Discussion Draft fails to restate the law of negligence. Contrary to the pronouncements of the American Law Institute, then,
the Discussion Draft is not principally an interpretative document
that seeks to provide an "explanation" or to "clarify" key terms of
tort law.7 Rather, as I will suggest, the Discussion Draft is a thoroughgoing normative document, one that seeks to promote one
normative theory of tort law over competing normative theories of
tort law. Specifically, the Discussion Draft promotes utilitarianism.
If the common law of negligence were best described as utilitarian,
then an accurate Restatement would also be utilitarian in character.
The problem with the Discussion Draft's descriptive account, then,
is not that it is normatively loaded, but that it is incorrectly normatively loaded. 8
In fairness, it must be noted that the Reporter of the Discussion Draft appears to think he has achieved theory neutrality with
respect to the standard for breach. 9 The Discussion Draft notes
that its account is consistent with "fairness" concerns as well as

6.

John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Placeof

Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657 (2001).

7. In the Forward to the Discussion Draft, Geoffrey Hazard, Director of the American Law
Institute, writes, "[h]erein the Reporter, Professor Gary T. Schwartz, undertakes to clarify the
meaning of such basic concepts of tort law as intention, recklessness, and negligence. The text
provides explanation and elaboration and, in accordance with the usual format, demonstration
through Illustrations." Discussion Draft, supra note 1, at xi (emphasis added). The Reporters
Introductory Note states that "[t]he purpose of this Restatement project is to work through the
'general' or 'basic' elements of the tort action for liability for accidental personal injury and property damage." Id., at xxL
8. The leading modern accounts of tort law each contain descriptive accounts that are

normatively loaded. See, e.g., Jules Coleman, CorrectiveJustice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL
STUD. 421 (1982) (corrective justice tort theory); Richard A. Epstein, A icory of Strict Liability,
2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973) (corrective justice tort theory); George P. Fletcher, Fairnessand

Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L REV. 537 (1972) (following the philosophy of John Rawls);
William 1L Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L.

REV. 851 (1981) (promoting wealth maximization); Ernest J. Weinrib, UnderstandingTort Law,
23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485 (1989) (following the philosophy of Immanuel Kant).

9.

Discussion Draft, supra note 1, § 4 cmt. j.
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welfarist concerns in this regard. 10 1 will argue below, however, that
this passing nod to theoretical pluralism or neutrality fails, as the
proposed Restatement's conception of fairness is also a utilitarian
conception.
The goal of the following discussion is not to criticize the
proposed Restatement's utilitarian account qua normative account.
Nor is it to criticize this account in order to make room for a distinct normative account. The point is that, for basic reasons of clarity and accuracy, a Restatement should restate the law, nothing
more and nothing less." Most importantly, it should not surreptitiously seek to redirect the moral course of tort law. Making the
common law of tort a vehicle for the promotion of utilitarianism
would be an important and controversial political act. If pursued at
all, it should be done subject to explicit discussion and overt efforts
at justification.
It is always of value to be clear on the distinction between
law as it is and law as it ought to be. 12 It is especially important to
do so, however, in systems of law in which stare decisis plays a role.
Under stare decisis, contrary to Hume's law, 13 courts may indeed
derive, to some extent, an "ought" from an "is," as the mere fact
that cases were decided in a certain manner in the past lends normative force toward deciding like cases in a like manner in the future. This is true for specific legal rules. In the hands of theorists
such as Richard Posner, however, this argument is applied more
broadly to second-order norms, such as the norm of efficiency. 14 In
other words, because past courts have sought to promote efficiency,
it is legitimate for courts in the present to do so as well. Thus, it is
crucial to restate the law of breach in a non-prejudicial manner so
as not to unleash normative forces that have not been properly legitimized through the mechanism of stare decisis.15

10.

Id.

11. For those readers who teach torts to law students, ask yourself what is your response to
students who ask about the purpose, function, or significance of the Restatement (Second). I
predict the answer is not that the Restatement is an instrument to shift and consolidate tort law
around the utilitarian normative paradigm.
12. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994); Jules Coleman, Nega.
tive and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1982).
13. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 561 (L.A. Selby & P.H. Nidditch ads.,
2d ed. 1978).
14. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW
17-19 (1987).
15. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 374 (1990).
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Judge Richard Posner thinks that tort law should seek to
promote wealth. 16 He also happens to think, as a positive matter,
tort law is best understood as having historically promoted
wealth. 17 Professor George Fletcher, on the other hand, argues that
the concept of reciprocity is the key to understanding the negligence
standard. 8 According to Fletcher, courts have sought to decide
cases in such a manner so as to promote a reciprocal sharing of
risks and benefits.' 9 While Fletcher's normative focus is fairness,
Posner's is wealth maximization, and the Discussion Draft's is social welfare, these accounts nevertheless share something very important: each provides a positive account of tort law that, as it happens, precisely dovetails with the prescribed normative account of
each. This finding is counterintuitive, as there is no logical connection between tort law understood as an historical institution and
tort law as it should ideally be constituted.
The utilitarian thinks tort law should be used as an instrument to promote social welfare because social welfare alone is what
is ultimately worth promoting. The Rawlsian thinks tort law should
promote fairness because fairness, understood in the broad Rawlsian sense of the term, is ultimately what social institutions should
seek to foster. Finally, the wealth maximizer thinks wealth should
be promoted because wealth is an important and uncontroversial
social value. In other words, these normative frameworks are justified from the top down, as a result of foundational normative commitments. None of these theorists argues that the reason tort law
should promote the normative ideal each prescribes is because tort
law has done so in the past. Thus, it is strange that there is any
correlation between how these scholars, qua normative theorists,
think the world should be, and how these scholars, qua lay social
scientists, think that the world has in fact been, with respect to the
standard for breach.
If welfare, fairness, and wealth were corporations and Gary
Schwartz, George Fletcher, and Richard Posner were their respective counsel, then, one would fully expect them, as good advocates,
to argue for their respective positive theses. They are not advocates,
however; but rather they are scholars. Scholars do not advocate for
instrumental reasons, they attempt to glimpse truth as best they
are able. Accordingly, they, no less than we, should expect no posi-

16. See generally LANDES & POSNER, supra note 14.
17. Id.
18. Fletcher, supranote 8, at 544.
19. Id.
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tive correlation between their respective positive and normative
theses, given that none have provided an adequate explanation of
how it is that negligence law has come to embody the right normative framework.
The existence of a positive correlation, then, stands as an
unexplained mystery. Less mysterious is the existence of the theorists' belief in such a correlation. One might easily imagine, for example, that there is some sort of cognitive bias at play. Utilitarians
tend to see the world through welfare-maximizing glasses, Rawlsians see the world through fairness-reciprocity glasses, and Posnerians see the world through wealth-maximizing glasses. This possibility is disturbing because it suggests that were either Posner or
Fletcher the Reporter for the Discussion Draft, rather than
Schwartz, the product would have been different. 20 This fact, if true,
would belie the ALI's claim that the proposed Restatement is simply
an explanation or clarification. What is needed, then, is a Restatement that is free, as much as is possible, from the normative commitments of any particular tort theorist.
The following discussion is meant as a plea for clarity with
respect to the positive and normative theses concerning the relationship between the standard for breach as it actually emerges
from litigated cases and the Hand Test rendered in cost-benefit
terms. What matters here is not the normative question of whether
tort law should seek to promote cost-benefit analysis. Perhaps it
should.21 Instead, the proper concern of a restatement of the common law of tort is whether the case law has, in fact, significantly
utilized the cost-benefit test in the standard for breach. The one
simple but extremely important point that will become apparent in
the following discussion is that the Hand Test appears to have
played almost no role in the determinations of the countless jury
decisions over the years that, taken together, constitute the substance of the standard for breach in American tort law. Instead, I
contend that the norms of ordinary morality, in all their normative

20. If such a cognitive bias exists, perhaps even more disturbing is the fact that some of the
century's leading, and most strongly normatively committed, tort theorists currently sit on the
federal bench.
21. Even for utilitarians, it is not analytic that either judges or juries should explicitly seek
to promote cost-benefit analysis, specifically, or social welfare, generally. The whole thrust of the
various forms of modern utilitarianism labeled as "rule utilitarianism," "indirect utilitarianism"
or "institutional utilitarianism" is that social welfare may best be promoted by not trying to
directly, explicitly, or intentionally promote it. See generally RUSSELL HARDIN, MORALITY
WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON 53-59 (1988); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3
(1955).

20011

NEGLIGENCE NORMS

869

heterogeneity and theoretical impurity, have been the overwhelmingly dominant influence in jury decisions on negligence.2 Even if
this fact would make no normative theorist happy, it may be a fact
nevertheless. Thus, the standard for breach as it has developed in
the case law over the years cannot be accurately restated in terms
of the utilitarian Hand Test (or in terms of any other single normative theory, for that matter).
In the following discussion, I will first consider and critique
the Discussion Draft's welfarist conception of breach, encapsulated
in a cost-benefit rendering of the Hand formula. Next, a more plausible conception of the restatement of breach will be examined, one
initially articulated in the Restatement (First).This account provides a moralized version of the Hand Test under which courts are
portrayed as appealing to community norms as part of an indirect
strategy for maximizing social welfare. This account is intuitively
more attractive than the Discussion Draft's account because it gives
the abstract Hand Test a more determinate content. Nevertheless, I
will argue that, due to its utilitarian characterization of social
norms, it fails to correctly restate the law of breach.
The rejection of both of the above versions of the Restatement
will have the impact of creating an either/or situation. Either the
proposed Restatement should drop the cost-benefit approach to
breach (and also restore duty to its rightful place as the first negligence element),23 or drop the word "Restatement" from the title of
the work. Neither suggestion is as radical as might appear to be the
case. Regarding the Hand Test, the draft could be amended to delete all the language prescribing a cost-benefit approach as well as
any suggestion that the balancing approach entails a consequentialist mode of practical reasoning. The balancing test, per se, may
remain, as such phraseology may adequately be used to characterize a theory-neutral, normatively pluralistic account of the reasonable person standard.2 4 Regarding the second suggestion, there is
precedent within the traditions of the American Law Institute for
removing the word "Restatement"from a draft document that is not
in fact a restatement.2 5 The alternative, after all, is for the word

22. See infra Part mI.
23. See generally Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 6.
24. See, e.g., RONALD DWORIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 276-313 (1986); Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontol-

ogy of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249 (1996); Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1996).
25. By 1992, the "1982 Tentative Draft No. 1" of the "Principles of Corporate Governance
and Structure: Restatement and Recommendations," had become the "Proposed Final Draft' of
the "Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations."
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"Restatement" to become a legal term of art, and for the tort restatement project to become a sort of institutionalized legal fiction,
one with a significant sub rosa political bite. These developments
would be inconsistent with the ALI's goal of increasing clarity in
the law.
I. THE DISCUSSION DRAFT'S APPROACH TO BREACH
Section A below briefly establishes the utilitarian nature of
the duty element in the Discussion Draft and then examines the
relationship between duty and breach. The next two Sections then
discuss alternative approaches to the standard for breach.
A. UtilitarianDuties in the ProposedDiscussion Draft
Professors Goldberg and Zipursky argue that the structure
and organization of the Discussion Draft are determined crucially
by its skewed normative vision of the role of duty. 26 Whereas the
common law gives duty a role that is both central and "relational,"
the proposed Restatement pushes duty under the rug. In the cases,
duty is the first question, not the last. As Cardozo famously argued
in Palsgraf,until the duty threshold is passed, proximate cause is
not even an issue.2 7 In the Discussion Draft, however, the element
of duty is relegated to the status of a possible policy-based exception to the standard analysis in which duty is simply taken for
granted. 28 Acting in this mode, a court may simply decide, for whatever reason, to deny liability by a finding of no duty.2 9 As Goldberg
and Zipursky argue, this account misstates the "relational" role-

30
played by duty in the common law.

Goldberg and Zipursky argue that the proposed Restatement
exhibits what they refer to as "duty skepticism," which is a normative vision of tort law that is skeptical of duty's relational role. 31
Elsewhere, they argue that duty skepticism is the tort law parallel
to the rights skepticism that pervaded constitutional law in the

26.

See generally Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 6.

27. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
28. See generally Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 6.
29. Id.

30.

Id.

31.

Id.

See also John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson,
146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733 (1998); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law
of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1998).
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early part of the twentieth century. 32 The ultimate source of each is
the philosophical positivism that pervaded the intellectual world
33
during that period.

The Discussion Draft is not, however, skeptical toward the
existence of duty per se, but only skeptical of relational duties. The
Discussion Draft contains a conception of duty that is implicitly
utilitarian. The utilitarian perspective on duty is that all people
have duties to all other people all the time, a duty "to the world," as
Judge Andrews long ago famously remarked in his dissent in Palsgraf.34 The Discussion Draft contends that duty is a "non-issue,"35
because there is always a duty. The Discussion Draft refers to the
duty in tort as a "general duty."3 s This conception of tort duty is implied by the more general act-utilitarian conception of moral duty,
according to which moral agents are obligated to seek to maximize
37
social welfare in all their actions.
For the utilitarian in a potentially tortious situation, the
duty of the reasonable person is to act so as to maximize social wel-

fare, not just one's own welfare. In other words, when taking actions that create risks to others, the reasonable person acts to

maximize the overall social welfare of the act. The actor takes account both of the value of the act to herself as well as the possible

32. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 31, at 1789.
33. Id. Out of positivism flowed a general skepticism toward the scientific legitimacy of
normative theory. Goldberg and Zipursky focus on this skepticism. I am interested in a related
alleged entailment for normative theory of positivism. During the ascendancy of positivism, a
belief took hold that utilitarianism was a scientific theory, whereas other normative theories
were based on empty metaphysics. In Bentham's oft-repeated quip, rights are nonsense on stilts.
From an historical perspective, it did not take long for metaethical theorists to destroy the claim
of utilitarianism's superior scientific status. Nevertheless, it was in this period that the Restatement (First)of Torts was promulgated. In other words, the initial Restaters had the misfortune
to be working at a time when some bad moral metaphysics was going around. Early utilitarian
approaches to tort law are found in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMiES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 94-96
(1881); James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L REV. 97, 110 (1908); Henry T. Terry,
Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1915). On Holmes' utilitarianism, see ILL PoHI2. AN, JUSTIcE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES AND UTILITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE (1984). See also Gary T. Schwartz,
The Characterof Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REV. 641 (1989) (finding utilitarianism
running through nineteenth century tort law). See generally Patrick J. Kelley, Who Dzcides?
Community Safety Conventions at the Heart of Tort Liability. 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 315 (1990)
(arguing that Terry's five-part negligence test was an improvement on Holmes' account, and that
Terry's test formed the basis of the Hand Test).
34. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., Co., 162 N.E. 99 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting);
see also Oliver IV. Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652, 660 (1873) (duty "of all the
world to all the world").
35. Discussion Draft, supra note 1, § 6 cmt a.
36. Id.
37. See generally SHELLY KAGAN, THE LIMITS OF MORALITY (1989). Goldberg and Zipursky
treat the utilitarian analysis of duty as a form of duty.skepticism because it fails to capture what
it means for a person to be under an obligation to another.
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disutility the act creates for the potential victim. The act is justified
only if the benefit outweighs the risk. The Discussion Draft uses
liability rules to enforce this moral standard, which it refers to as
38
the "ethical norm of equal consideration."
B. The Discussion Draft's Elevation of the Hand Test ForBreach
In the case law, breach is related to the first element, duty,
in that negligence is simply the breach of a duty. 39 This fact creates
an obvious problem for the Discussion Draft. As just discussed, the
Discussion Draft sweeps the element of duty under the rug. If
courts do not first engage in an inquiry into whether the element of
duty is satisfied, how then will they be able to determine negligence, since negligence is simply the breach of a duty? In other
words, because the Discussion Draft fails to state duty as an overt
element, it cannot overtly define negligence as the breach of a

38. Discussion Draft, supra note 1, § 4 cmt. j C'The defendant who permits conduct to impose on others a risk of harm that exceeds the burden the defendant would bear in avoiding that
risk is evidently a party who ranks personal interests or welfare ahead of the interests or welfare
of others. This conduct violates the ethical norm of equal consideration, and a tort award seeks
to remedy this violation."). The notion that utilitarians treat all people equally is an idea that
has developed in utilitarian moral theory in response to the criticism that utilitarianism allows
individuals to be sacrificed for the good of the whole. See generally HARDIN, supra note 21;
Rawls, supra note 21. The complexities of this core metaethical debate cannot be explored hero.
It must be noted, however, that utilitarian tort theory faces a parallel problem as utilitarian
moral theory, as it is not the individual plaintiff, per se, whose interests are taken into account
but rather the class of potential plaintiffs. See Discussion Draft, supra note 1, § 6 cmt. h C'in
conducting such an analysis, the court can take into account factors that might elude the attention of the jury in a particular case, such as the overall social impact of imposing some significant
precaution burden on a category of actors.") (emphasis added). Thus, indeed, it is possible for
individual victims to be sacrificed to the utilitarian whole. The Discussion Draft's notion of
"equal consideration" is then an ex ante conception. As is the case with utilitarian moral theory,
such justifications are cold comfort to real plaintiffs who seek redress for real injuries, as their
claims may be subordinated to the overriding concern for aggregate welfare. See generally JULES
L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992). The Discussion Draft does make one superficial nod
toward acknowledging the moral complexity of determinations of negligence, When providing a
rationale for negligence liability, the Discussion Draft notes "fairness" between the litigants as a
factor. This is evidently an attempt to address the criticism of the utilitarian approach that it
does not deal with the actual moral relationship between the injurer and victim. The problem,
however, is that the notion of fairness as understood by the Discussion Draft is completely reducible to utilitarianism for the reason just indicated. Fairness just means that, ex ante, liability
rules are as likely to promote one's welfare as the welfare of others. This conception has no connection to the leading conceptions of fairness that animate modern tort theory, such as those of
Fletcher, Keating, or Wright. Nor, of course, does it take account of broader conceptions of corrective justice that do not reduce to fairness. See, e.g., id.
39. See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 2.
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duty. 40 The proposed Restatement sidesteps this problem by pro41
ceeding directly to a discussion of negligence or fault.
The proposed Restatement sets forth a utilitarian "riskbenefit test" for negligence which it explicates as follows: "the 'risk'
is the overall magnitude of the risk created by the actor's conduct
and the 'benefit' is the advantages that the actor or others gain if
the actor refrains from risk prevention measures." 42 Alternatively,
the proposed Restatement says it offers a "cost-benefit test" in which
C'cost' signifies the cost of precautions and the 'benefit' is the reduction in risk those precautions would achieve." 43 Finally, the proposed Restatement says, "[Miore simply, this can be referred to as
supporting a 'balancing approach' to negligence." 44 The Discussion
Draft explicates the balancing approach as follows:
The balancing approach rests on and expresses a simple idea. Conduct is negligent
if its disadvantages exceed its advantages, while conduct is not negligent if its ad-

vantages exceed its disadvantages. The disadvantage in question is the "magnitude of risk" that the conduct occasions: the phrase "magnitude of risk" includes

both the foreseeable likelihood of harm and the foreseeable severity of harm,
should the incident ensue. The "advantages" of the conduct relate to the burdens of
risk prevention that are avoided when the actor while engaging in conduct declines
to incorporate some precaution. The actor's conduct is hence negligent if the magnitude of the risk exceeds the burden of risk prevention.5

This passage from the Discussion Draft evinces a utilitarian conception of balancing, as "disadvantages" are weighed against "advantages." In particular, this is a quantitative conception, one in
which these values are to be measured on a single scale by comparing their respective "magnitudes" in order to determine whether
the advantages "exceed" the disadvantages. 46
Note as well that this is a Hand formulation, in that it emphasizes the "burdens of risk prevention," rather than the overall
40. Had the Discussion Draft wished to highlight the general duty of all to all, it could then
have defined breach as the failure to act so as to maximize welfare. Apparently, however, the
Discussion Draft wishes to downplay duty in order to downplay debate over vwelfarism as the
undergirding normative rationale for duty in tort.
41. Discussion Draft, supra note 1, § 4.
42. Id. § 4 cmt. d.
43. Id. § 4. The Discussion Draft notes that the cost-benefit factors make up the "primary

factors" to consider, id., and the "factors that ordinarily play the primary role in making determinations on the negligence issue." Id. § 5 cmt. b. This crucial point is noted in passing without

any further consideration of the nature of these other factors or under what circumstances
judges or juries are to take them into account. This is a huge lacunae in the Discussion Draft.
The existence of these other factors indicates that the Discussion Drafts utilitarian account is
not the whole story.
44. Id. § 4 cmt. d.
45. Id.

46. Such a quantitative conception is not a necessary feature of utilitarian moral theory.
See, e.g., DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984).
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utility of defendant's act. 47 The Hand Test, as famously articulated
by Judge Learned Hand, focuses on the burden that must be expended in order for a tort defendant to avoid liability, specifically; if
B<PxL, then one will be liable if one's action results in injury to
another. 48 The Discussion Draft gives the "reasonable care" standard a gloss that implicitly reflects the Hand Test formulation. 49
The Discussion Draft claims that the best way to understand
the case law is that it has reflected an attempt by courts to implement the balancing approach described above. 50 The Discussion
Draft explicitly equates its suggested balancing approach with the
Hand Test approach. 51 The Restatement provides a long string cite
of cases that purportedly utilize the balancing or Hand approach. 2
The Discussion Draft equates this approach with cost-benefit
analysis. I will argue below, however, that there is no logical connection between factor balancing, generically understood, and the

cost-benefit approach. First, however, I will seek to refute the Discussion Draft's claim that cost-benefit analysis is the most accurate
means to restate typical jury applications of the reasonable person
standard.

47. Discussion Draft, supra note 1, § 4 cmt. d. The Discussion Draft states that what matters is the burden of precaution issue, and not the overall value of the activity. Id. § 4 cmt. i C'In
those cases in which a party does allege negligence in the actor's decision to engage in an activity, the overall utility of the activity is a factor the court needs to consider. For more ordinary
negligence claims, however, the utility of the activity is of minimal relevance. Supplying olectricity, for example, is of extraordinary value to the community. Even so, the transmission of
electricity poses serious risks. If certain precautions can minimize those risks, it is the burden of
those precautions, and not the value of the activity itself, that is of primary relevance in a negligence analysis."); see also Stephen G. Gilles, Causationand ResponsibilityAfter Coase, Calabresi
and Coleman, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 255, 257 (1996) (uncommon for courts to find entire activity negligent).

48. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) ('[flf the probability [of an accident] be called P; the injury, L; and the burden [of adequate precautions], B; liabil.
ity depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B is less than PL.").
49. Discussion Draft, supra note 1, at § 4. CAn actor is negligent in engaging in conduct if
the actor does not exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances. Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that it
will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of the harm that may ensue, and the burden that
would be borne by the actor and others if the actor takes precautions that eliminate or reduce the
possibility of harm.") (emphasis added).
50. Id., § 4 Reporter's Note cmt. c ("A balancing approach to negligence has been accepted in
judicial opinions in a majority of jurisdictions.") The Hand Test, per se, was not developed at the
time of the Restatement (First). Hand was involved in developing the Restatement (First). The
articulation of the Hand Test in CarrollTowing is arguably seen as Hand's attempt to promote
the risk-utility analysis of the Restatement (First).See Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand
Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1029-32 (1994).
51. Discussion Draft, supra note 1, § 4 cmt. g ("A famous exposition of the balancing approach was by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. CarrollTowing Co.").
52. Id. § 4 cmt. c.
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II. FAILURE OF THE DISCUSSION DRAFT'S COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS

A. The Restatement's Misguided Attempt to Read Cost-Benefit
Analysis Into the Reasonable Person Standard
The proposed Restatement does not develop a focused set of
arguments to establish the claim that cost-benefit analysis is the
most accurate means to restate the case law on the breach element.
Instead, it offers a number of scattered remarks from which the
Discussion Draft's position may be constructed. The proposed Restatement first notes that a number of federal appellate courts have
explicitly endorsed the Hand formula.5 3 This is loosely presented as
evidence for the claim that the Hand Test has really played a pervasive role in case law, despite the failure of trial courts to explicitly mention cost-benefit analysis in jury instructions.
Upon reflection, however, this argument is obviously flawed.
From the mere fact that some federal appellate courts have been
influenced by the normative account of breach contained in the
Hand Test, there is no reason to conclude that trial courts have
been similarly influenced. If explicit mention of the Hand Formula
is taken as evidence of the influence of this formula in federal appellate courts, then by parity of reasoning, one would more naturally conclude that the failure of the formula to receive explicit
mention by trial courts is evidence of its lack of influence there.r 4
Certainly, in the absence of explicit discussion of the Hand Test by
trial courts, the initial presumption, albeit a rebuttable one, should
be that it has not played a role there.
The fact that negligence is a fact question determined by jurors is additional reason to think that trial court decisions do not
result from cost-benefit analysis. Under settled American practice,
juries are under no obligation to explain or justify their decisions.15

53. Id.
54. REsTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §172 (Tentative Draft No. 4) (The comparison between
the social utility of the act and the magnitude of the risk is occasionally, but only occasionally,
stated as the basis of decision in negligence cases."); see also Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining
Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the Reasonable Person Standard,and the Jury, 54 VAND.
L. REV. 813 (2001); Michael D. Green, Negligence = Economic Effieiency. Doubts, 75 TEX L REV.
1605 (1997) (documenting paucity of negligence cases explicitly adopting cost-benefit balancing
approach as of adoption of the Restatement (First) in 1934).
55. Stephen Gilles writes:
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The jury simply applies the "reasonable person standard" to the
facts as it finds them, and issues a general verdict.5 6 Contemporary
jury instructions typically tell the jury to apply the reasonable person standard, without explaining or defining this standard.5 7 In

particular, juries do not receive instructions to apply the Hand
Test, the risk-utility test, or the risk-benefit test. This is straightforward and powerful evidence for the supposition that juries do not
apply any of these tests.
In products liability cases, where defense attorneys might
seek Hand Test instructions, they nevertheless typically choose not
to do so because they fear jury nullification. 58 In other words, seasoned trial lawyers intuit that typical jurors would find a costbenefit mode of reasoning morally unattractive. This is additional
evidence that juries do not think in Hand Test terms in the usual
case. 59 Moreover, even if they were morally inclined to do so, typical
juries may be practically incapable of such reasoning.6 0

With regard to the probability component of the Hand Test,
the Discussion Draft says, "although 'probability' is a word that
may be more technically precise, nevertheless, the Restatement uses
the word 'likelihood,' as this is a word in common usage with a clear
meaning."6' In this passage, the proposed Restatement seeks to sug-

Under settled American practice, the jury applies the negligence standard to
the facts it finds, and renders only a general verdict that does not explain or
justify the outcome. Together with the rules effectively limiting judicial review
of jury verdicts to cases of manifest error, these features of trial practice ensure
that the operational meaning of negligence is largely determined by juries in
particular cases, rather than by the doctrines stated in appellate decisions (and
restated in Restatements of Torts).
Gilles, supra note 54, at 814.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 1038
(1991).
59. See Gilles, supra note 50, at 1049 (discussing rejection of model cost-benefit instruction
by Los Angeles trial judges on grounds it would invade the province of the jury).
60. Leon Green attacked the Restatement (First)on the basis that its formulations were not
suitable for jury instructions. There is no reason to think this situation has changed. See Leon
Green, The Tort Restatement, 29 U. ILL. L. REV. 582, 595 (1935) C'Cases come to the courts
through formal pleadings cut to some pattern or patterns of legal theory. Evidential data are
offered to support these and the opposing theories. There is no suggestion that the tenor of the
Restatement is designed for these purposes. After the evidence is heard, the theories insisted
upon by the parties through their lawyers are translated to the jury by instructions in terms of
formulas. Certainly the black letter statements are not intended to supplant the formulas already worked out and utilized by the courts in tort cases. These are too ponderous and elaborate
for such a purpose. Assuming that a judge would know which ones to give, no jury would comprehend them.").
61. Discussion Draft, supranote 1, at § 4 cmt. f.
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gest that the cost-benefit test is capable of being performed by ordinary people.
But what is the significance of this point? The proposed Restatement presumably means to imply that as the test is one that
can be stated in pedestrian, rather than technical terms, it therefore is a test capable of application by ordinary persons such as jurors. This only establishes the hypothetical that if juries were to
apply the Hand test, the use of "likelihood" as compared to "probability" would make the test more easily applicable by ordinary
people. This does nothing to establish that jurors who are not told
to apply the Hand test, either in terms of probability or likelihood,
will somehow be more inclined to apply the test.
Next, consider an ordinary language argument pertaining to
the reasonable person standard.6 2 The ordinary language phrase
"reasonable person" does not in any way suggest a utilitarian or
economic approach of the sort conventionally read into the Hand
Test. According to Webster's, "reasonable" simply means "sensible,"
not "extreme," "immoderate," or "excessive."' ' Based on the mere
fact of their hearing jury instructions, then, there is simply no reason to think that juries, composed of laypersons as they are, would
somehow insert a technical mode of reasoning such as cost-benefit
analysis into their untutored deliberations regarding the behavior
of reasonable persons.
It will be the atypical juror who will have had more than a
passing acquaintance with cost-benefit analysis specifically, or
utilitarian reasoning more generally. Even when jurors are exposed
to utilitarian thinking, however, this exposure probably will not
influence their actual behavior. There are two separate reasons,
each grounded in a competing conception of human nature, for
thinking that welfare-maximizing actions will not be forthcoming
from typical jurors.
On one assumption about human nature, people are narrowly self-interested rational actors, homo economicus.6 To the extent that jurors are rational actors, mere exposure to utilitarianism

62. While ordinary language philosophy has rightfully been rejected as an approach to deriving metaphysical or epistemological conclusions, ordinary language is nevertheless valuable
for uncovering the internal point of view of particular linguistic communities. See ERIC VOGELIN.
THE NEW SCIENCE OF POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION 27-31 (1952) (distinguishing concepts used
for theoretical purposes and concepts used as working symbols in a set of institutional arrangements and human actions in a community).

63. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LJ.NGUAGE

UNABRIDGED 1892 (3d ed. 1993).
64. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:3:863

would not cause them to act according to the dictates of utilitarianism. Instead, if a particular outcome would tend to promote their
perceived interest, they would promote that outcome, regardless of
the decision mandated by the Hand Test.
On the second, competing assumption about human nature,
people are best modeled as predominantly, rather than narrowly,
self-interested rational actors. 65 In other words, people are, at least
to some extent, morally motivated. The jury system appears ideally
designed to take advantage of jurors' moral propensities because
jurors typically have little to gain one way or another from the outcome of a trial. Thus, their propensities toward self-interest will be
unlikely to interfere with their propensities toward moral behavior.
The genius of the jury system is that by compelling jurors to deliberate in an environment in which their actions are neutral in terms
of their self-interest, the cost of moral behavior is reduced practically to zero. Thus, predominantly self-interested jurors might nevertheless act so as to promote morally desirable outcomes, as doing
so can be done with almost no personal sacrifice.
The implication of this finding is not, however, that jurors
will therefore act as utilitarians. It is more plausible to suppose
that under these conditions, jurors will simply make decisions
based on their ordinary moral understanding of the world. In other
words, the determination of liability will depend largely on whether
the behavior in question conformed to community norms. 66 One
thing is certain; ordinary morality bears little resemblance to utilitarianism. 67 This explains, for example, the venerable criticism of
utilitarianism that it is too morally demanding. 68 Therefore, we
should not expect that morally motivated jurors applying the reasonable person standard would act in a manner so as to maximize
social welfare.

65. See Steven Hetcher, HobbesianMoral and PoliticalTheory, 98 MIND 435 (1989).
66. See Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1 (1999); Kelley, supra note 33, at 353-63 (cost-benefit negligence is a distortion of traditional, normatively superior, reasonable person standard based on community norms); Stephen
R. Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND TORT LAW
7 (Gerald Postema ed., 2000) ("Jointly-created risks are, very roughly, those that fall within the

range of risks which is normally or customarily associated with a given pattern of social interaction. Such risks are properly regulated by a negligence rule, which is itself best understood by
reference to a constrained form of cost-benefit analysis.").
67. See, e.g., ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 20
(1984); Bernard Williams, Consequentialism and Integrity, in CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS
CRITICS (Samuel Scheffier ed., 1988).
68. J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1973).
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In sum, this Section has rejected a number of arguments for
thinking real-world juries apply a utilitarian reasonable person
standard. The fact that some federal circuit courts explicitly discuss
cost-benefit analysis is no reason to think that at trial, juries implicitly appeal to this analysis. Just the opposite; the fact that there
is no explicit mention is reason to think there is not an implicit appeal. Furthermore, even in products liability cases when lawyers
might seek Hand Test jury instructions, they typically decline to do
so. Most important in understanding juror behavior is the fact that
juries do not receive jury instructions regarding cost-benefit analysis. Moreover, jurors do not typically learn about cost-benefit analysis elsewhere so as to be able to intuitively appeal to it in their deliberations. Finally, even if jurors happen to learn about costbenefit analysis, there is no reason to think that they are inclined
to promote it. Instead, we might expect them either to act in a narrowly self-interested manner or to conform to the expectations of
ordinary morality, neither of which is likely to coincide with global
welfare maximization.
B. The Restatement's Misguided Attempt to Assimilate Cost-Benefit
Analysis and FactorBalancing
The previous Section examined and rejected the proposed
Restatement's claim that the case law of breach is best restated in
terms of cost-benefit analysis. This Section refines this inquiry by
focusing on the relationship between the idea of balancing and costbenefit analysis articulated in the Restatement (First).
Just as the duty issue is relegated to a latter section of the
proposed Restatement, where it can be treated as an exceptional
case, 69 so too for social norms, where they are relegated to Section
11, entitled "Custom," which deals with the rule of custom in determining negligence. The Discussion Draft follows The T.J. Hooper
in holding that conformity to custom may count as evidence of due
care but is not dispositive with regard to due care.70 Thus, the Discussion Draft only countenances a role for social norms in the special situation in which there is an instantiated custom in place,
such that either the defendant pleads conformity as a defense or the
plaintiff seeks to demonstrate lack of conformity as evidence of
negligence.

69.

See generally Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note G (criticizing this move by the Discussion

Draft).
70.

See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
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What is missing is any acknowledgement of the pervasive
role that social norms play in providing grist for the jury's concrete
application of the reasonable person standard. This process may
occur not only in situations in which custom is explicitly introduced
as evidence by one of the parties, but in all situations in which lay
juries deliberate.
While not currently a part of the Discussion Draft, incorporating social norms into its balancing test might render the Discussion Draft more plausible. It will be worthwhile, then, to briefly
consider the Restatement (First)'ssocial norms approach in this regard. The Restatement (First)held that courts should pay attention
to "social value[s]" of the surrounding community in making determinations of the standard of care required of the reasonable person
under the particular circumstances of the case at bar.7 1 In contrast,
the Discussion Draft merely says that courts should determine reasonableness "under all the circumstances." 72
The Restatement (First)approach may be preferable, then, as
it gives the reasonable person standard a determinate content. The
content comes from the thick moral norms of the actual communities out of which the pool of jurors are drawn. Jurors have no choice
but to appeal to community norms since the language of the "reasonable person standard" is general and must be interpreted. Jurors, being ordinary members of the community untrained in utilitarian, Kantian, or other theoretical reasoning, have nothing else to
appeal to but their social sense of how ordinary moral members of
the community would have acted in parallel circumstances.
In an influential article, written during the period in which
the Restatement (First) was first being discussed, Warren Seavey
sought to legitimate community norms as an objective source of legal decisions. 73 Seavey writes:
In this computation there are involved two distinct kinds of problems. The first is

purely mathematical, namely the ascertainment of the degree of likelihood that
certain events will or will not occur. As to this, the result would be the same under
any system of law; it is achieved by purely intellectual processes. The complete answer can be obtained, however, only by solving the other type of problem, that is
the comparative values of the conflicting interests of the actor and the one whose
interests are threatened. This evaluation calls for the so-called moral qualities. To
the extent that the solution of these problems involves standardized elements, or,

71. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §292(a) (1934). The Restatement (Second) follows the
Restatement (First) in this regard.

72. Discussion Draft, supranote 1, § 4.
73. Warren A. Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 n.1 (1927).
On the influence of Seavey, and the history of the Restatement (First)generally, see Green, supra
note 54.
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phrasing it differently, to the extent that the actor's conduct is determined with
reference to the community valuations, we may say that an objective test applies.7 4

In the above passage, Seavey first notes that the process of discounting for the uncertainty of particular injuries is a process that
will not vary with particular communities. Speaking anachronistically, this is the "P," or probability, component in the Hand Formula. But regarding the values to be imputed to the benefit received by the tortfeasor and the loss inflicted on the victim, respectively, "community valuations" are to serve as the measure. While
these valuations may vary from community to community, the fact
that they will be standardized within particular communities nevertheless allows for the conclusion that "an objective test applies."
In an important recent article defending a Restatement
(First)approach to the Restatement project, Stephen Gilles endorses
the legitimacy of community values as a source of objective legal
standards. 75 Gilles adds an additional gloss to Seavey's account by
arguing that the negligence test is best understood as incorporating
a "Hand Norm." According to Gilles, "[tihe Hand Norm tells us that
it is negligent to omit a precaution if the reduction in expected accident costs would have been greater than the costs of the precaution."76 The Hand Test, then, is not merely an arid academic formulation but also one important component of the set of norms that
characterizes the community morality of jurors. If Gilles is right,
the task of the positive theorist is potentially rendered more tractable. The Hand Test is no longer merely a description of what juries
do. Instead, it attempts to give center stage to cost-benefit balancing by explaining that such balancing is itself a moral norm held by
jurors.
With reference to shared community norms of the sort that
juries consult, Gilles refers to the "common coin of 'social value.' "37
He goes on to say, "human beings have various interests, and those
interests have more or less social value."7 8 Thus, for Gilles, talk of
community morality and norms shifts to talk of values on a uniform
scale in which interests have "more or less social value," and all

74. Seavey, supra note 73, at 8 (emphasis added).
75. Gilles, supra note 54, at 833-34 CJurors can safely be presumed to be familiar with
prevailing community values. Beyond that, in consulting community values the jury would in an

important sense be applying the 'law' because the common law has designated those values as
part of the reasonable person standard!').
76. Id. at 818.
77. Id. at 828.
78. Id.
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values may be reduced to a "common coin." Elsewhere, Gilles refers
to "social value" as a "metric for weighing risk against utility."7 9
Recasting balancing as a moral norm, however, does not establish the primacy of a welfarist conception of fault or breach. This
is because there is no logical connection between factor balancing,
generically understood, and the cost-benefit approach. Both Gilles
and the Discussion Draft take too literally the metaphors of "balancing" and "weighing" of utility. A set of scales can balance
weights at either end, just as a bathroom scale reduces all persons
to one unit they all share, physical weight. But ordinary usage also
permits a more general sense of the words "weigh" and "balance" to
mean simply that rational actors may take account of numerous
factors in their practical reasoning with regard to a particular issue. 80 Practical reason itself typically involves taking account of
numerous factors. There is nothing intrinsically utilitarian or consequentialist in practical reasoning. A deontologist can engage in
practical reasoning by balancing various considerations, every bit
as much as a utilitarian can.

79. Id. Gilles believes that the reasonable person will sometimes explicitly apply the Hand
Test. Gilles appears to conceive of this in the manner that act utilitarians conceive of the utility
maximization test. Gilles also appears to believe that people will sometimes act like rule utili.
tarians, conforming to customs and social norms rather than performing Hand Test calculations
on each occasion in which they act. Id. at 825. Here, Gilles falls unwittedly into the trap of
thinking that customs are welfare-maximizing such that conforming to them will necessarily bo
a welfare-maximizing shortcut; however, customs are not always welfare-maximizing. The custom may be structured so as to allow for third-party externalities such that the custom is wolfare-maximizing for the conformers but not for the overall community. Or the custom may bo tho
result of a collective action problem such that a collection of individually maximizing actions
serves to maintain a practice that is nevertheless suboptimal. See Hetcher, supranote 66, at 52.
80. Hand himself was not deluded into thinking that the Hand Test implied weighing in
anything more than a metaphorical sense. Nor did Hand have any illusions that values could be
quantified. He wrote: "[O]f these factors care is the only one ever susceptible of quantitative
estimate, and often that is not. The injuries are always a variable within limits, which do not
admit of even approximate ascertainment; and, although probability might theoretically be estimated, if any statistics were available, they never are; and besides, probability varies with the
severity of the injuries." Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949). Hand noted elsewhere that the problem with "the appraisal and balancing of human values" is that "there are no
scales to weigh" them on. Hand continued, "the difficulty here does not come from ignorance, but
from absence of any standard, for values are incommersurable." LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF
LIBERTY 161 (1963). Note how this contrasts with Posner's hope that, someday in the future, we
will be able to attach dollar figures to the relevant factors. McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826
F2d 1554, 1557 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.) ("Conceptual as well as practical difficulties in
monetizing personal injuries" mean that, "[f]or many years to come juries may be forced to make
rough judgments of reasonableness, intuiting rather than measuring the factors in the Hand
Formula."). For a recent defense of his view, see Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and
Tort Law: A PhilosophicalInquiry, in PHILOSOPHIcAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 99 (David G.
Owen ed., 1995).
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For example, a deontologist may balance freedom of action
against security.8 1 Doing so in no way transforms the deontologist
into a utilitarian. This can be seen by imagining a community of
deontologists. In this community, like all communities, accidents
will occur and thus, there will be injuries to tort victims due to allegedly negligent actions of potential tortfeasors. The utilitarian
will be committed to interpreting the jury's response to an injury to
a plaintiff and the injurious action by the tortfeasor in cost-benefit
terms, despite the fact that no one on the jury conceived of the bal82
ancing test in these terms.
Gilles' argument appears to provide support for the utilitarian thesis, due to its conceptualization of the social values at stake
as "Hand Factors."8 3 Stripped of rhetoric, however, the so-called
Hand factors are simply the core factors of any account of negligence. These factors will be present under any theoretical conception of the reasoning processes engaged in by jurors.
The first of Gilles' Hand factors concerns the utility of the
defendant's action. Any theoretical approach to torts must take account of the defendant's actions. The Kantian will hold this action
to the test of the categorical imperative.8 4 The corrective justice
theorist will consider the sort of wrongfulness contained in the action.8 5 In a general sense of the term, each of these can be seen as
"factors" looked into by courts. The same is true for the second factor that courts consider, the injury to the plaintiff. Here as well, a
Kantian or corrective justice theorist will, of course, provide a role
for the victim's injury within her theoretical account of the negligence standard.
The third Hand factor is based on the fact that, ex ante, the
injury to the plaintiff was not certain to occur (otherwise it would
be an intentional tort). Gilles and the Discussion Draft describe this

81. Keating, supra note 24.
82. When the U.S. Supreme Court performs its multi-part balancing tests in deciding cases
involving basic constitutional rights, it would be implausible to suggest that the Court has first

reduced all the competing rights-based considerations to some "common coin" of consequentialist
value. Likewise, there is no reason to think that when the ordinary juror weighs or balances
various community-based moral factors, that she is therefore somehow transformed into a utilitarian.
83. Gilles, supra note 54, at 818 ("The 'Hand Factors,' if you will, are thus the raw data to
which the 'Hand Formula' is applied to determine whether there was negligence in accordance
with the 'Hand Norm."); Id. at 817 n.5 ('I use 'Hand Formula approaches' as a shorthand for the

whole range of approaches that balance the costs and benefits, however defined, of taking greater
care to avoid an accident.").
84. See Keating, supra note 24; Richard W. Wright, The Standardsof Care in Negligence
Law, in PmLOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 249 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
85. See COLEMAN, supranote 38.
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factor in terms of "risk," "probability," or "likelihood," of the injury
occurring. There is nothing that is particularly utilitarian, however,
about factoring in risks, probabilities or likelihoods. Because outcomes that are probable, rather than certain, are an unavoidable
part of life, any theory of practical reason, and any normative theory of liability in negligence, must sometimes take account of them.
It is apparent, then, that with regard to all three of the socalled Hand factors, there is nothing that is inherently utilitarian
about any one of them. Any normative approach will necessarily
involve the balancing of these considerations. What is distinctively
welfarist is putting all such considerations on one scale of value.
But as we have seen, there is no evidence that this is what juries
do, and there is, in fact, good reason to think this is not what they
do. In other words, there is nothing to make the label "Hand factors" more appropriate than "Wright factors," "Keating factors," or
"Coleman factors."
At times, the Discussion Draft echoes the Restatement (First)
in emphasizing the multiple considerations that enter into the assessment of fault, as, for example, when it discusses the idea of
"ethical particularism" in commentary to Section 5.86 Reviewing the
famous Holmes/Cardozo debate regarding the appropriateness of
bright-line negligence rules, the Discussion Draft endorses Cardozo's position and describes it as an approach favoring "ethical
particularism." But it is clear, notwithstanding this nod to the possibility of genuinely pluralistic reasoning about fault, that the Discussion Draft understands ethical particularism in utilitarian
terms. Its claim is simply that each fact pattern giving rise to a
negligence claim in tort litigation presents particular factual details
that distinguish it from other similar factual situations. Thus,
rather than having a bright line rule to deal with similar situations, courts allow the negligence question to go to the jury, which
can then perform more fine-grained Hand factor analysis based on
87
all the details of the case.
The Discussion Draft's error is to reduce all the ethical particularities of specific fact patterns to their consequential value,
that is, how they are to be quantified in terms of cost-benefit analysis. In fact, however, the argument from ethical particularism to
which the Discussion Draft cites has nothing to do with making a

86. Discussion Draft, supra note 1, § 5 cmt. d. The Discussion Draft makes a rare citation to
a philosophical text on the topic: Jonathan Dancy, Ethical Particularismand Morally Relevant
Properties,92 M4IND 530 (1983).
87. Discussion Draft, supranote 1, § 5.
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full count of utilities. Rather, the ethical particularities thought to
be implicit in specific situations cannot be reduced to any particular
critical normative framework, be it consequentialist or nonconsequentialist.8 8 As Part Three below will indicate, the moral
judgments rendered by juries are often based on a variety of moral
factors such as directness of the injury and reciprocity, which cannot be reduced to consequentialist factors to be measured by their
relative magnitudes.
It is worth noting that the proposed Restatement's misconception regarding the prospect of quantifying all factors relevant to
negligence has an important practical bite. The proposed Restatement notes that directed verdicts for negligence, per se, should increase as more exact measurement of utilities becomes feasible.8s In
other words, the role of the jury in tort law will diminish over time,
as utilitarian science displaces lay juror guesses regarding the exact utilities to be attached to the Hand factors. Given the important
and unique role that juries have played in American tort law, this
aspect of the Discussion Draft deserves greater attention from future scholars.
As a general matter, the Discussion Draft gives the jury
short shrift. Similarly, the jury is barely mentioned in Posner's discussions in which he develops his positive account.9 0 Instead, these
texts repeatedly refer to the actions of "courts." The term "court"
when referring to a trial court is ambiguous between the actions of
judges and the actions of juries, however. Generally speaking,
judges apply, and sometimes make, law while juries find facts. With
regard to a jury's determination of negligence, the situation is more
complex. Bohlen refers to negligence as a mixed question of law and
fact.9 1 Hand refers to the jury as, in effect, enacting mini-legislation

88. Dancy, supranote 86, at 530.
89. Discussion Draft, supra note 1, § 5 cmt. b.

90. Posner notes that social efficiency is the dominant philosophy among judges and policy
makers and that it is less controversial than other philosophical views, such as those that require redistribution of wealth. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 14. It should be clear, then, why
Posner would not be in a position to discuss the role played by the jury as distinct from the court,
as one cannot credibly claim that utilitarianism is the social philosophy among the class of ordi-

nary people who typically fill the ranks of juries (the claim is equally implausible for judges as
well, but this point is not a present concern).
91. Frances Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 119 (1924).
Terry argued that the issue of negligence turns on what a "standard man," not "an ideal or perfect man, but an ordinary member of the community," would have done under the circumstances.
Terry, supra note 33, at 47. Questions of negligence are left to the jury "because the jury is supposed to consist of standard men, and therefore to know of their own knowledge how such a man
would act in a given situation." Id. Moreover, Terry thought this appropriate because these are
questions of fact; "the inference of reasonableness or unreasonableness, of due care, of negli-
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when making findings with regard to negligence. 92 This is recognition of the broad discretion left in the hands of jurors when it comes
to the determination of negligence.
Summing up this section, we have seen that both the Discussion Draft approach and the Restatement (First)approach are misguided attempts to assimilate factor balancing and cost-benefit
analysis. The previous Section demonstrated that the Discussion
Draft's attempt to read cost-benefit analysis into the reasonable
person standard was implausible. Overall, then, Part Two has
shown that the Restatement's cost-benefit conception of fault fails to
restate the law of breach.

III. MORAL HETEROGENEITY IN THE REASONABLE PERSON
STANDARD
The previous Part accomplished the goals set out in the first
paragraph of the Article. There I said that I would explore the twin
failings of the proposed Restatement. The Restatement's first failing
is that it dramatically overstates the role of utilitarian, cost-benefit
analysis in the reasonable person standard. The above discussion
demonstrated that this is clearly the case. The Restatement's second
failing is that it understates the role of non-utilitarian negligence
norms in filling out the actual substance of the reasonable person
standard. As the above discussion indicated, the proposed Restatement has, by and large, moved away from the role accorded to social
norms in the earlier Restatements. While the Restatement (First)
incorrectly dealt with social norms by reducing them into a utili-

gence, is in its nature one of fact, the data furnishing the minor premise and the major premiso

being drawn from common experience [i.e., the jury's knowledge of how an ordinary person would
act], whereas in a true inference of law the major premise is a rule of law." Id. at 50; see also
FRANCESCO PARiSI, LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION 226-27 (2d ed. 1992)

(suggesting that American courts at the turn of the century tended to define negligence in terms
of the care the average person would take).
92. In Stornelli v. United States Gypsum, Hand wrote:
It is true that we think of that common-law duty as though it were imposed before the event, because it demands only 'reasonable' care; but that does not
specify the conduct required and creates a duty incapable of being known in advance, and it is ascertained and imposed only retroactively. Our excuse is that
it is fair to exact conformity to such a standard because it should be the inherited portion of the actor; although never formulated before-being measured by
a unique occasion-he will divine it by intuition. Nor is it derived alone from
forecasting the probable course of events, though that enters into it. It involves
a matching of human interests: it is "legislation" in parvo [in little].
Stornelli v. United States Gypsum Co., 134 F.2d 461, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1943); see also Mark
Gergen, The Jury's Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the American Common Law, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 407 (1999).
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tarian framework, nevertheless there was an acknowledgement of
their pervasive role in the courts' search for concrete values to place
into the balancing test. The Discussion Draft, by contrast, sweeps
social norms under the rug. For this reason, the proposed Restatement fails to adequately account for the role played by social norms
in providing content to the abstract reasonable person standard.
In order to better understand the normative factors that go
into filling out the reasonable person standard in particular factual
circumstances, more empirical work would be required to identify
the contours of the thick moral sociology of the communities in
question.93 This final Part will briefly consider a sample of what
such a study might turn up.
I will focus on the roles played by strict liability and directness of injury in the reasonable person standard. The orthodoxy is
of course that the reasonable person standard is not a strict liability standard. Strict liability is liability without fault, and the reasonable person standard requires fault. As long as the injurer was
acting reasonably, taking due care, the reasonable person 'will not
be liable for injuries. Some courts have observed that the fault
standard is a morally superior standard, claiming it to be "immoral
and unjust" to hold an injurer liable in a situation in which the injury was not reasonably preventable.9 4 Despite this orthodoxy, however, the cases themselves are more complex. In particular, there is
strong evidence that strict liability plays a substantial role in actual jurors' application of the reasonable person standard. Indeed,
there is strong evidence that this has long been the case. Bohlen,
for example, writes,
[t]he general utility of such conduct in not likely to receive much consideration

from a jury who sees before them a plaintiff whose vital interests have been
harmed by a particular instance of it. A court might emphasize to the jury ad nauseam the social value of the act, but the jury would only see one man injured by
another. And only the most confirmed optimist would dare to hope that they would

93. See NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDEntS
104-11 (2000). Feigenson finds that jurors do "total justice." What is meant by total justice is

that jurors decide liability not solely on either a welfare.maximiing criterion or on a corrective
justice criterion, but rather, they take account of a plurality of factors. Some of these factors may

be dubious from the perspective of prevailing critical moral frameworks, such as the wealth of
the defendant or the likelihood that the defendant is insured. Nevertheless, these factors may
play a role in ordinary morality and this is what matters when presenting the best positive account of juror behavior. See also LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930). Note that juries do not
determine other features of tort law. These other features may well be modeled in terms of other
normative frameworks. See Jules L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Low, 97 YALE LJ. 1233
(1988).
94. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Miller Steamship Co. CThe Wagon Mound No. 2%)

[1967] 1 App. Cas. 617, 644 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Australia).
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judge the defendant's conduct by what the ideal creature, the "reasonable man"
would do .... The concept universal among all primitive men, that an injury
should be paid for by him who causes it, irrespective of the moral or social quality
of his conduct, while it has disappeared from legal thought, still dominates the
opinion of the sort of men who form the average jury. 95

Bohlen's remarks indicate that in his experience, the actual outcome of jury decisions applying the reasonable person standard will
reflect the tendencies of juries to find liability based on whether the
defendant "caused" the "injury" rather than on whether the defendant was acting to maximize "social value" at the time he caused
the injury. In other words, many actual court decisions tend to reflect strict liability more than negligence liability.
There is reason to believe that juries continue to sometimes
apply a strict liability standard. Gilles writes, "[flurthermore, the
juror objections to Hand Formula balancing in large part amount to
a preference for strict liability in certain types of cases." 96 While
Gilles perceptively notes that jurors show a preference for strict
liability in "certain types of cases," he does not specify which types.
One particularly salient factor appears to be the directness of the
injury. Juries composed of ordinary people appear to give this factor
great weight in their findings of liability.
Perhaps the most famous directness case is Polemis.97 In this
case, the court held that because of the directness of the injury,
there could be a finding of liability, even without consideration of
whether there was reasonable foreseeability on the part of the defendant.98 This case is sometimes contrasted with Wagon Mound II
in which the Privy Council, as just noted, rejected the directness
test as "immoral and unjust." The Wagon Mound II court here exhibits a value judgment which evidently is at odds with ordinary
morality, however, as across most jurisdictions, directness and reasonable foreseeability have each commanded respect from jurors. 99
With respect to strict liability, Gilles notes: "But the common
law has been committed to a general regime of negligence liability
for over a century. To allow the resistance of some jurors to return

95. Bohlen, supranote 91, at 119.
96. See generally Gilles, supra note 54.
97. In re Polemis, [1921] 3 K.B. 560.
98. According to the Restatement, the risk must be "recognizable" (reasonably foreseeable).
99. SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 350 ('There are two general approaches to the problem of proximate cause-the hindsight, or direct-causation approach and the foreseeability approach. Practically every jurisdiction has used both, at one time or another."). In addition, the
hindsight or direct-causation approach may introduce further biases not consistent with wealth
maximization. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998).
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that regime would be legislation writ large, not small."1 00 The
problem with Gilles' remark is that it begs the question. There is no
reason to think that jurors ever stopped taking strict liability seriously. Thus, there is no need for them to "return" to this regime.
Furthermore, because there is no need to return to strict liability, it
is inaccurate to characterize jury determinations of liability that
incorporate strict liability considerations as "legislation writ large."
Rather, these are simply instances of mini-legislation of the sort
discussed above, in which juries plug their norms of reasonable behavior into the abstract reasonable person standard.
It will be of interest to conclude with a bit of normative sociology in order to get a better sense of the bona fides of strict liability, as judged by the morality of ordinary jurors. It was Bohlen's
failure to appreciate the normative respectability of non-utilitarian
frameworks that caused him in the above passage to disparage ordinary jurors as "primitive" for supporting a strict liability standard.
Note that ordinary morality may support the normative intuition that undergirds strict liability, particularly when the injury
is direct. For example, if we are in a restaurant and I accidentally
and non-negligently spill coffee on your coat which is sitting on the
back of a chair, it would certainly be consistent with, and perhaps
demanded by, ordinary morality for me to offer to pay for the drycleaning. It would be no surprise, then, if ordinary people employed
similar reasoning when functioning as jurors in tort suits, by sometimes holding injurers liable for their directly caused injuries. 10 1
I am not claiming that strict liability and directness are the
core, or even the main normative influences, in jury determinations
on the issue of negligence, but that they are among the normative
influences that may come into play. Other fact patterns may highlight other normative concerns, such as reciprocity of risk, the pro-

100. See generally Gilles, supra note 54.
101. All torts have one thing in common: an injured victim. Thus, by necessity, the loss must
either lie with the victim or be shifted elsewhere, such as onto the injurer. Of the two, it is far
from clear from a moral point of view, to say the least, that it is the victim who should suffer the
loss. See COLEMAN, supra note 38. The "fault standard" is a rule under which victims bear the
risk of non-negligent injuries. While the fault standard is often contrasted with strict liability,
Judge Guido Calabresi more accurately notes that the so.called fault standard is equivalent to
strict liability of another sort, strict victim liability. In other words, when no one is at fault for
an accident, the injury will lie with the victim upon whom it fell, rather than being shifted back
onto the injurer who caused the injury. Guido Calabresi, Optimal Deterrenceand Accidents, 84
YALE L.J. 656 (1975); see also Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Correctite Justice: A Prognatic Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L REV. 2348 (1990) (jury should be left to
decide where the losses in negligence cases should reasonably fall, even including strict liability).
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duction of social welfare, or correcting wrongful injuries. Fletcher is
right, then, to note the role of reciprocity, and Schwartz is right to
note the role of welfare promotion. They err, however, in thinking
that their normative accounts are exhaustive, or anything close to
it.
Perhaps Bohlen was emboldened to denigrate his fellow citizen as primitive because Bohlen thought he had modern science on
his side. As mentioned earlier, Bohlen was writing during a brief
period of history when utilitarianism was considered by its adherents as not merely normatively superior but also epistemically superior. 10 2 It was scientific whereas other theories were based on superstition and bad metaphysics. Seventy years after Bohlen's remark, however, utilitarianism has been on the academic ropes for a
quarter century and most leading normative theorists are not utilitarian.10 3 These normative theorists may or may not be right, but
they are hardly primitive. Thus, Bohlen and those in his line cannot
simply assume the superiority of their preferred normative framework. With this in mind, the Discussion Draft should either drop its
exclusive commitment to cost-benefit analysis or quit calling itself a
Restatement.
Many normative tort theorists have attempted to redescribe
the positive law of the past in their normative image. One explanation of this phenomenon speculated on earlier was that it was the
result of a cognitive bias. An alternative explanation, however, is
that these theorists have consciously attempted to restate the law
in correlative positive terms in order to promote their normative
ideal, which these theorists view as superior to informal community
norms. 104

Finally, it is worth mentioning that it might make sense to
stand this notion on its head and see the heterogeneity of ordinary
morality as valuable. The heterogeneity is not valuable, per se, but
as the product of a valuable process whereby the community is allowed to make its moral voice heard. If, in a representative democracy, politicians should to some extent function as norm entrepreneurs, then the fact that ordinary people have their moral voice
heard by means of jury primacy with regard to the negligence standard may be a feature of American tort law that is desirable from

102. Bohlen, supra note 91.
103. Coleman, Dworkin, Habermas, MacIntyre, McKinnon, Nagel, Nozick, Rawls, Rorty, and
Williams, to name a few.
104. Indeed, for an act consequentialist, such an instrumental use of scholarship may bo domanded, if the normative goal of welfare maximization would thereby be promoted.
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the perspective of democratic theory. American tort law is distinct
in the primacy of the jury. The jury may serve an important democratic function of filling out the substance of the negligence standard with the dominant social norms of the demos. The primacy of
the jury is threatened, however, by the Discussion Draft. As mentioned earlier, veiled within its analysis is the belief that once we
are able to apply magnitudes more accurately to the Hand factors,
the need for the jury is diminished. 0 5 Thus, the proposed Restatement, in addition to not accurately restating the law of breach, may
also be anti-democratic.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the Discussion Draft's attempt to
restate the breach element of the negligence cause of action. We
have seen that the Discussion Draft conceives of the reasonable
person standard as consisting almost entirely of the application of a
cost-benefit version of the Hand Test. I have argued that this characterization of the case law is not descriptive or interpretative, but
rather normative. In particular, it represents an attempt to change
the reasonable person standard into a tool for promoting social welfare. Next, we reviewed the Restatement (First)'s more promising
attempt to restate the element of breach in terms of community
norms of conduct. We saw, however, that this account nevertheless
fails because it reduces the jury's consideration of social values into
a form of utilitarian effort at wealth maximization. Thus, we must
conclude that both the Discussion Draft approach and Restatement
(First)approach fail to restate the law with respect to the element
of breach.
This is a strong claim. Is it perhaps an overstatement on my
part? I think not. The Discussion Draft is not a restatement of the
law of breach, by the lights of the plain meaning of the term "restatement." Rather, it seeks to articulate and proselytize a normative conception of breach not found in the common law standard as
filled out by juries. The law of breach does not contain a unified
critical normative vision. Because it evolved as a messy real-world
institution, it is not pure in this manner, but rather normatively
heterogeneous. The Discussion Draft isolates and highlights a certain strand from this larger mosaic, in order to promote this strand.
As mentioned at the outset, the ALI says that the tort's Restatement is meant to be an "explanation" and "elaboration." Gilles re-

105. See supra text accompanying notes 89-92.
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marks that a Restatement should be at most incrementally normative. 06 The Discussion Draft is not an elaboration, nor a proposal
for incremental change. Rather, it is a proposal for a fundamental
change, namely, to remake the breach standard in tort law so that
it exclusively promotes social welfare.
My analysis entails an either/or conclusion. Either the Restatement should drop the cost-benefit approach to breach, or drop
the word Restatement from the title of the work. The draft could
simply be amended to take out all the language reflecting a costbenefit approach. The balancing test, per se, can be left insofar as
the language could be used in a theory-neutral way to characterize
a test that juries can perform to give some content to the reasonable
person standard. Alternatively, as mentioned at the outset, the ALI
could abandon the title of restatement. Although this course is perhaps unattractive to the Reporter and the ALI, it is hardly unprecedented and may, ironically, give added credibility and influence to the project.

106. See generally Gilles, supra note 54.

